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In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom all authority and to Whom, 
as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, 
 
We, the people of Éire, 
 
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, 
Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, 
 
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle 
to regain the rightful independence of our Nation, 
 
And seeking to promote the common good, 
with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, 
so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, 
true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, 
and concord established with other nations, 
 
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution. 
 
— Preamble, Irish Constitution of 1937 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
“Dignity” is suddenly everywhere in law and philosophy, even though 
it has long been in decline in general usage.1 In a popular view, this promi-
                                                            
* I am grateful to Josef Ansorge for assistance with the Irish research for this paper, and to Yale 
Law School for funding his work, as well as to James Chappel and Oran Doyle for advice, and 
Sanford Diehl for supplementary help. A shorter version of this paper appears under the same 
title in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christoper McCrudden, ed., 2013). For a popular 
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nence is essentially due to World War II’s aftermath, when in the shadow of 
genocide the light of human dignity shone forth. More specifically, it is 
dignitarian constitutionalism that re-founded public law for our time. The 
concept of dignitarian constitutionalism channeled Immanuel Kant’s pio-
neering Enlightenment insistence on inherent human worth into the UN 
Charter (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the 
German Basic Law (1949), all three of which begin with the dignity of the 
individual as basic principle. In this conventional wisdom, Germans after 
the Holocaust went furthest to rethink constitutionalism, and their example 
of how to defend human dignity was later taken up in South Africa and be-
yond.2 Though it took some time, dignity has since proceeded in the last 
few decades, in tandem with the larger fortunes of international human 
rights law, to become a crucial watchword, going global in various constitu-
tions and international treaties, and offering judicial guidance for the pro-
tection of basic values.3 Certainly it is true that interest in dignity swarms in 
legal cases and philosophical discussions today in ways that demand ex-
planation, and the current dispute among judges and commentators about 
how to interpret dignity provisions is not uninteresting. But is the conven-
tional wisdom about where dignity came from correct in the first place? 
The notion of dignity was not necessary to constitutionalize rights, ei-
ther in 1776 in Virginia or in 1789 in France—or again in 1946 in France, 
when the country not only relit its constitutional torch but drew on the 
flame of constitutional rights guarded by Central and Eastern Europeans in 
the 1920s.4 Conversely, West Germans writing the Basic Law weren’t yet 
concerned by the Jewish tragedy. And while it is certainly true that Kant 
occasionally referenced dignity, none of his political disciples have made 
anything of this fact—and his current philosophical disciples have only 
started highlighting dignity in the last few years. For that matter, there 
were no Kantians in Germany of note after World War II (including in the 
rooms where the Basic Law was prepared and debated), nor really any-
where else. And actually, contrary to familiar beliefs, it was not West Ger-
many that first constitutionalized dignity as a leading principle anyway. 
In this essay, I show that individual human dignity entered global con-
stitutional history in an unexpected place and at a surprising time: Ireland 
                                                                                                                                          
version of some of the arguments, see Samuel Moyn, Dignity’s Due, THE NATION, November 4, 
2013, reprinted in SAMUEL MOYN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USES OF HISTORY (2014). 
1. See Appendix for usage charts in ordinary language. For recent spikes in law and philoso-
phy, see infra Part 8. 
2. To take one of sundry examples of this conventional wisdom, Thomas A. Howard writes: 
“In 1949, with the Holocaust and the Nuremberg trials fresh in mind, the drafters of the new 
West German constitution, or Grundgesetzt, included in its opening article the statement that 
„the dignity of man is inviolable.‟” THOMAS A. HOWARD, IMAGO DEI: HUMAN DIGNITY IN 
ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (2013). 
3. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). 
4. Jürgen Habermas addresses the significant problem of dignity‟s surprisingly belated discov-
ery, given the historical grounds of rights. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: A RESPONSE, ch. 2 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2012). I reject his solution, which claims that 
dignity must have been there implicitly all along. 
2
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol17/iss1/2
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. VOL. XVII 
2014] The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity 41 
in 1937. It risked—and often still risks—transforming the tradition of rights. 
After all, 1789 and the liberal secular values for which that date stood in 
European and world history were not popular in the 1930s or even 1940s, 
and may not have survived the coming of dignity unscathed. More specifi-
cally, what first canonized dignity was what I call “religious constitutional-
ism”: a new form of constitutionalism navigating between the vehement re-
jection of the secular liberal state long associated with the French 
Revolution and the widespread demand for an integrally religious social 
order. To the extent Europeans did not vote with their feet for fascist re-
gimes in an era when most concluded that secular liberalism had failed, it 
was religious politics that beckoned, indeed almost everywhere at a time of 
profound intersection of Christian faith and nationalist sentiment. Outside 
the Iberian peninsula the new Christian states of the time did not survive 
the political ecology of either the 1930s, when fascism triumphed, or the 
1940s, when fascism died. But, despite the demise of the Christian States, 
Christian Democracy, when it arose after World War II to decades-long 
dominance in Western Europe, conserved a surprising amount of what 
came before—notably the central place of religious teachings in public life, 
including constitutional law. Ireland’s early move to Christian Democracy 
portended the framework that several other Western European countries 
would take up, which were un-coincidentally the only ones in which digni-
ty had a constitutional presence for a long time. 
History matters to the current enthusiasm over human dignity, because 
while all political and legal concepts are elastic, none ever proves to be ex-
actly as malleable as any other. All bear the marks of their special historical 
trajectories, so long as partisans of some continuity in their meaning remain 
to fight on its behalf. This is certainly true of dignity, which emerged as 
part of an attempt to find a new form of democracy—one that in Europe 
today, and now many other places too, attracts considerable support. Even 
when not welcomed precisely because it promises faith a central public 
role, religious constitutionalism is sometimes justified as a lesser evil—or, 
even more boldly, as a transitional device for liberals who surmise that 
there is no alternative for the moment to integral religious politics except a 
constitutional regime with strong religious features that might later become 
increasingly peripheral.5 But while this last approach is understandable, it 
is little more than a bet. There is no reason to believe that such an interme-
diate constitutional stratagem itself either staves off the feared alternative, 
or promotes the desired outcome, even in the long run. 
Dignity’s origins hardly rule out conceptual evolution thanks to new 
forces. Yet if dignity’s trajectory also suggests that such forces can unex-
pectedly arise to mobilize constitutional or otherwise fundamental terms 
and concepts in different directions than at the start, long into the history of 
                                                            
5. Consider Jan-Werner Mueller, who explicitly foresees a model in the history of Christian 
politics for a Muslim turn away from extremism. Jan-Werner Mueller, From Christian Democra-
cy to Muslim Democracy?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/from-christian-democracy-to-muslim-democracy-. 
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their interpretation, it provides no extra solace to the betting man. To be 
sure, there is no theoretical reason to deny the possibility that these forces 
can entirely transform the semantic meaning, and political uses, of a con-
cept (or the larger constitution in which it figures) in a spirit they prefer. 
But the case of human dignity shows that it is equally possible that the re-
sults will be an essentially contested notion of little use to further debate 
and a possible distraction from it—except insofar as judges are successfully 
assigned the task of interpreting it, at the price of democratic legitimacy, 
and then only to the extent they do not themselves reproduce the public di-




2. TRADITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: OLD, NEW, AND RELIGIOUS 
Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch was the obvious person—the right man in 
the right place at the right time—to have the most developed insight avail-
able into the trajectory of constitutionally declared rights and their fledg-
ling post-World War II internationalization. But he did not mention human 
dignity, let alone celebrate it. 
A Russian-Jewish émigré in Paris and later New York, Mirkine-
Guetzévitch (1892-1955) was a founder of the now prestigious discipline of 
comparative constitutional law.6 In the 1920s, Mirkine-Guetzévitch had 
been premier analyst and proponent of “the new constitutionalism”—as he 
influentially dubbed it. In his view, the vogue of the rights of man in consti-
tutions had primarily come about as a result of World War I, notably in the 
constitutions of the eastern European states that arose on the ruins of fallen 
empires. When he published his analytical study of postwar European con-
stitutions in the early 1950s, he registered the restoration of European de-
mocracy after World War II but also the return of the progressive tendency 
to enthrone the rights of man as the first principles of political order. For 
Mirkine-Guetzévitch, the victory of Allied arms in World War II allowed 
not for the invention but for the revival of the new constitutionalism he had 
first identified and justified.7 
                                                            
6. Born in Kiev, from a highly Russified family, he was a liberal who sympathized with Alex-
ander Kerensky until the Bolsheviks took power. After holding on for two years trying to fo-
ment opposition, he fled to Paris, ascending to some prominence as a law professor. Com-
pelled to leave France in 1940, he survived World War II in the United States, where he helped 
found the famous École libre des hautes études. Thereafter he split his time in between the two 
cities that sheltered him. For a vivid portrait of his cohort, see Dvozinar Kévonian, Les juristes 
juifs russes en France et l’action internationale dans les années vingt, 34 ARCHIVES JUIVES 72, 72-94 
(2001) (Fr.). For his legal thought, see Stéphane Pinon, Les idées constitutionelles de Boris Mirkine-
Guetzévitch, in CARLOS MIGUEL HERRERA, 2 LES JURISTES FACE AU POLITIQUE: LE DROIT, LA 
GAUCHE, LA DOCTRINE SOUS LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE 61-123 (2005) (Fr.).  
7. See generally BORIS MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH, LES CONSTITUTIONS DE L‟EUROPE NOUVELLE (1928, 
1930, 1938) and LES CONSTITUTIONS EUROPÉENNES, 2 vols. (1951) (Fr.) [hereinafter LES 
4
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The old constitutionalism, even when it involved a written constitution, 
didn’t typically proceed from the rights of man. The French tradition from 
1789 took the Virginian example of 1776 to the national level where the 
Americans that same year had decided not to proceed (the framers had 
merely appended a bill of privileges to their federal constitution under 
pressure). But this 1789 tradition was spurned when it came time to found 
the French Third Republic in 1870-77. Through modern times, and indeed 
long after World War II, the British were proud of disdaining written con-
stitutionalism, to say nothing of the constitutionalization of rights. Not-
withstanding some Latin American ventures, the end of World War I, 
therefore, was the true inflection point for the global ascendancy of consti-
tutionally announced rights; and for Mirkine-Guetzévitch it always seemed 
as if constitutionalism based on les droits de l’homme succeeded by easterniz-
ing. The best, albeit short-lived, example remained the Weimar constitu-
tion, but in fact all of the post-imperial states from the Rhine to the Urals 
had enshrined rights in a similar manner.8 After the retrieval of this tradi-
tion by the Resistance, the post-World War II consensus about human 
rights, as signaled by the United Nations Charter and made concrete in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, finally swept the European 
continent. It took the truly pioneering interwar breakthrough to a new 
stage. Given the precedent of the Weimar Constitution, he hoped West 
Germany’s Grundgesetzt or Basic Law (1949) was part of this trajectory.9 
Though it has much to recommend it, no one follows Mirkine-
Guetzévitch’s presentation of the progress of rights-based constitutionalism 
today.10 Present at the creation of dignitarian constitutionalism, Mirkine-
                                                                                                                                          
CONSTITUTIONS EUROPÉENNES]. See also generally his most important theoretical works, LES 
NOUVELLES TENDANCES DU DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (1933, 1936) (Fr.) [hereinafter LES 
NOUVELLES TENDANCES] and DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL INTERNATIONAL, ch. 6 § 2 (1933) (Fr.).  
8. See generally BORIS MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH WITH ALPHONSE AULARD, LES DÉCLARATIONS DES 
DROITS DE L‟HOMME: TEXTES CONSTITUTIONNELS CONCERNANT LES DROITS DE L‟HOMME ET LES 
GARANTIES DES LIBERTÉS INDIVIDUELLES DANS TOUS LES PAYS (1929) (Fr.); LES NOUVELLES 
TENDANCES, supra note 7, at ch. 3. After first making himself Paris‟s expert in Soviet law, 
Mirkine-Guetzévitch became a scholar of the French Revolution under the tutelage of the fa-
mous Aulard, linking it with his work in comparative and international constitutionalism. See, 
e.g., Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, L’influence de la Révolution française sur le développement du Droit 
international dans l’Europe orientale, 22 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L‟ACADÉMIE DE LA HAYE 299, 299-
458 (1928) (Fr.). 
9. On the Resistance, see LES CONSTITUTIONS EUROPÉENNES, supra note 7, at ch. 4; BORIS 
MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH WITH HENRI MICHEL LES IDÉES POLITIQUES ET SOCIALES DE LA 
RÉSISTANCE (1954) (Fr.). On rights after World War II, see LES CONSTITUTIONS EUROPÉENNES, 
supra note 7, at ch. 8. His immediate postwar writings on international human rights are La 
protection internationale des droits de l’homme, REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE (Oct. 1946) 
(Fr.); La défense des Droits de l’homme et la charte des Nations unies, in LA BATAILLE DE LA PAIX 
(1946) (Fr.); and L’O.N.U. et la doctrine moderne des droits de l’homme, 55 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 161, 161-98 (1951) (Fr.). At the behest of Henri Laugier, he also 
provided the UN‟s nuclear commission on human rights, charged with drafting the Universal 
Declaration, with his expertise, editing the first ANNUAIRE DES DROITS DE L‟HOMME (1946). See 
René Cassin, Souvenirs sur B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, in HOMMAGE À B. MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH, 
1892-1955, at 31 (1955) (Fr.). 
10. See, e.g., OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Michel Rosenfeld 
5
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Guetzévitch may simply have been blind to the era’s true breakthrough. 
Perhaps he didn’t—more generously, couldn’t—understand in real time 
what has proven to be a considerable step forward in retrospect. It may be, 
however, that Mirkine-Guetzévitch is a better guide to what mattered just 
after war and genocide, since he did not make the mistake of connecting 
rights with dignity.  
After all, for a long time, including in the 1940s, dignity was most 
strongly correlated with religious constitutions in general – of which the 
German was merely one among others—and Christian Democratic consti-
tutions in particular. Those constitutions as much broke with 1789 as safe-
guarded it, let alone rehabilitated it after disaster. The Irish were the true 
pioneers both in the development of religious constitutionalism and in 
symbolizing its project through appeals to human dignity. In their 1937 
constitution, they gave dignity foundational placement, as a religiously-
inspired root concept connected (as in the later West German case) to the 
subordination of the otherwise sovereign democratic polity to God, and for 
many to the moral constraints of his natural law. This essay takes up this 
neglected but revealing fact. I contend that it is critical that dignity came to 
the world as part of the establishment of an alternative constitutionalism—
let’s call it “the newer constitutionalism” of Christian Democracy. So far as I 
know there is no general historical study of its emergence, and though Ran 
Hirschl has contributed a valuable overview of what he provocatively calls 
“constitutional theocracy” 11  today, there is so far no recognition that reli-
gious constitutionalism is the framework in which human dignity first be-
came canonized. This newer constitutionalism crystallized precisely in the 
1930s when it seemed to so many as if secular liberalism had no future. It 
was initially part of a replacement package for that secular liberalism, and it 
remained so in Germany in 1949. The conventional wisdom about the in-
ception of constitutional dignity, in other words, is by and large false. 
It then makes more sense that Mirkine-Guetzévitch found nothing of 
value in dignity. Indeed, as the 1930s passed, when dignity made its consti-
tutional entry, his liberal trend based on the rights of man was heartbreak-
ingly cut off by different modes of dictatorial rule, both pagan and reli-
gious. Every tragedy needs a chorus: “The Spanish Constitution of 1931 
was the last act of the new constitutional law of Europe,” he recalled grimly 
twenty years later.12 “*W+ell before 1939, one after another, the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe abandoned their democratic constitutions to 
become totalitarian.”13 It is therefore both crucial and mysterious that, 
thanks to the Irish, dignitarian constitutionalism also came about in this 
                                                                                                                                          
and András Sajó eds. 2012), though the editors do acknowledge that the field “became estab-
lished as a separate scholarly discipline thanks to the scholarship of Boris Mirkine-
Guetzévitch.” Id. at 5. 
11. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010). 
12. LES CONSTITUTIONS EUROPÉENNES, supra note 7, at 42. 
13. Id. See also Mirkine-Guetzévitch, La Constitution Espagnole de 1931, 2 REVUE D‟HISTOIRE 
POLITIQUE ET CONSTITUTIONNELLE 258, 258-64 (1938) (author‟s translation). 
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very period. If dignitarian constitutionalism is a bequest from history that 
we have learned to use for our own ends, it is interesting all the same—and 
perhaps disturbing—that it came from a different place and time than we 
thought.  
To understand the original meaning of constitutional dignity, I pro-
pose, it is necessary to plunge into the confusing years just before war and 
genocide, for dignity was a response to different circumstances. The most 
decisive and illuminating context for the move to constitutional dignity, it 
turns out, is not in the shocked conscience “after Auschwitz” but in political 
Catholicism before it. Political Catholicism remained dignity’s dominant 
framework for decades thereafter, when the Holocaust still did not figure in 
moral consciousness.14 
 
3. MARCH 1937: CATHOLIC DIGNITY BETWEEN CORPORATISM AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
Anyone interested in “human dignity” as we know it should be inter-
ested in March 1937, when it made its spectacular entry into world poli-
tics—including, thanks to the Irish, constitutional politics. 
Prior scholarship has already established that dignity long ago origi-
nated as one status word among others in a universe of aristocratic and hi-
erarchical values. It originated as the literal notion of “rank”—above all 
high rank above other humans. James Q. Whitman has argued, following 
Alexis de Tocqueville, that high status was “democratized” over time.15 But 
for all its plausibility this thesis about long-term social relations does noth-
ing to explain the specifics of dignity’s ideological trajectory in the 1930s 
and 1940s—let alone since. As late as the 1930s, in tune with its millennial 
prior trajectory, dignity attached to a huge range of objects, humanity rare, 
and individual humanity extremely rare, among them. There was thus little 
prior precedent for the novelty of Ireland’s constitutional preamble, alt-
hough the word “dignity” had previously circulated in world affairs, in-
                                                            
14. The present essay applies prior findings about the mid-century relevance of Christian per-
sonalism to the topic of human dignity (and Ireland) on which I had not focused before. For 
background on Christian personalism, see THE LAST UTOPIA, supra note 3, at 64-66, 191-92, 209-
10; Samuel Moyn, Personalism, Community, and the Origins of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann ed., 2011). In many pioneering writ-
ings, Mary Ann Glendon has asserted the intersection of Catholic social thought and post-
World War II human rights, an approach I supplement mainly by restoring interwar context 
and highlighting how this essential relationship could emerge due to very contingent and 
short-term developments (who won the war, for instance). Most recently, see Mary Ann Glen-
don, The Influence of Catholic Social Doctrine on Human Rights, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Roland Minnerath, et al. eds., 2010). 
15. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, ‘Human Dignity’ in Europe and the United States: The Social Foun-
dations, 25 HUM. RIGHTS L.J. 17, 17-23 (2004); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights (Meir 
Dan-Cohen ed. 2012) (discussing Whitman‟s themes). For further remarks on Whitman‟s his-
torical claims, see infra note 59. 
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cluding one or two constitutional articles.16 Then events in international Ca-
tholicism intervened, with the Irish constitutionalization of individual dig-
nity as one consequence. 
In fact, in March 1937 dignity already had an important place in Catho-
lic politics, but it was radically different than the one it has had since then, 
thanks to the epoch-making reassignment of the concept from groups to in-
dividuals. At the beginning of the month, thanks to Pope Pius XI’s encycli-
cals Casti connubi (1930) and Quadragesimo anno (1931), dignity still attached 
primarily to collective entities like workers and religious sacraments like 
marriage. Though not utterly without precedent, it was in March 1937 that 
dignity attaching to individuals (more precisely, persons) crystallized as a 
visible ideological option. In the 1930s, no one could have guessed what 
would become of this option, in large part because the Irish Constitution’s 
version of dignity reflected such a minority political choice in the landscape 
of political Catholicism. The years during which it was framed were the pe-
riod in which Catholic states were rising, typically based on corporatist ra-
ther than supplementary individualist notions. 
In these states, it was family or labor that was dignified, not persons 
(and thus not persons with rights).17 Preceded by a year by António Sala-
zar’s Portuguese constitution, the purest move to a constitution integrating 
corporatism occurred in Austria in 1934, which “Austro-fascist” Catholic 
leader Engelbert Dollfuss consciously announced as enacting Quadragesimo 
anno’s economic and social principles. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, that fan of the 
French Revolution, denounced these as perverse revivals of the Old Regime 
in constitutionalist disguise. But it surely mattered that these were not only 
pseudo-constitutional regimes but also ones sometimes echoing the perva-
sive corporatist assignment of “dignity” to groups.18 Not long after, Spain 
with its secular and indeed anticlerical constitution of 1931, fell prey to war 
and dictatorship, and Francisco Franco introduced dignity to the quasi-
constitutional documents of his regime in allegiance to reigning corporatist 
orthodoxy.19 In the international Catholic context, the Irish constitution’s 
framing occurred in the shadow of this trend-setting wave of dignitarian 
corporatism. 
Yet it took place at a time of novel and at first brief and modest availa-
bility of a dignitarian alternative based on persons—an alternative it hap-
pened to encode. The central source of the conceptual work to make possi-
                                                            
16. The most important of these is a subsidiary article in the Mexican Constitution of 1917 that 
already shows the importance of Catholic social thought. For a valuable survey of different 
uses of human dignity in chiefly philosophical sources, see MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS 
HISTORY AND MEANING (2012). However, Rosen dwells neither on precisely when various 
meanings were culturally, politically, or legally salient—lacking tools besides clarification of 
isolated quotations—nor on why the competition between different conceptions of dignity 
went in one direction or another over modern history. 
17. For the best survey of these years, see POLITICAL CATHOLICISM IN EUROPE, 1918-1965 (Tom 
Buchanan and Martin Conway eds., 1996). 
18. Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Le néo-absolutisme corporatif (Autriche et Portugal), L‟ANNÉE 
POLITIQUE ET ÉCONOMIQUE 251, 251-72 (1934) (Fr.). 
19. See LEY ORGÁNICA DEL ESTADO [ORGANIC LAW OF SPAIN], Jan. 11, 1967. 
8
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ble the Irish Constitution’s assignment of “dignity” to the individual was in 
a raucous French dispute of the mid-1930s around the nature of Catholic 
politics, among those recovering from an earlier flirtation with far right pol-
itics and in a dispute with persisting reactionaries about what sort of re-
sponse to offer to the secular liberalism everyone thought on its deathbed. 
The leading historian of this dispute, James Chappel, has dubbed this 
conflict one between corporatists (who in France would ultimately support 
the Vichy regime in the name of Christian principle) and “civil society 
Catholics.” The intellectual debate and political controversy between these 
two groups assumed its classic form as a response to the Popular Front, for 
the dispute raging in 1934-36 was about what sort of response to offer to the 
frightening alliance of communists and socialists of the era. 
These two groups of Catholics agreed on the rejection of the modern, 
liberal secular republic, which they viewed as immoral and individualistic. 
Instead, they favored the dispersal of authority to the “natural” social hier-
archy established by God and descending through religious institutions, lo-
cal communities, and patriarchal families. This agreement was perfectly 
obvious to contemporary witnesses, such as celebrated political theorist Mi-
chael Oakeshott, who in this era offered readers a conspectus of European 
political thought in which “Catholicism” was a possible option alongside 
“representative democracy,” “communism,” “fascism,” and “National So-
cialism.”20 Catholic social theory, rooted in God’s natural law, opposed lib-
eralism out of its historical associations with individualism, secularism, and 
relativism.21 But where the civil society Catholics distinguished themselves 
was in their assignment of importance to what they called “the human per-
son” as an alternative to the dissolute individualism they agreed with other 
Catholics in stigmatizing. The human person, a central icon of civil society 
Catholicism transnationally starting in 1934, would become the bearer of 
“dignity.” Corporatists themselves, Chappel shows, referred to the human 
person too; just as some of their civil society foes ended up supporting the 
Vichy regime. But it seems clear that “the dignity of the human person” 
mainly became one slogan for civil society Catholics attempting to stave off 
both secular liberalism, with its destitute atomism, and corporatist reaction, 
with its demand for clerical forms of authoritarianism or flirtation with Na-
zi Germany and other fascist regimes that were viewed as fit for support in 
spite of the fact that they were “pagan.”22 
In spite of the emergence of the civil society option, corporatist ideolo-
gy was the dominant version of political Catholicism until the outcome of 
World War II made the religious authoritarianism in Spain and Portugal or 
                                                            
20. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPE xii (Michael Oakeshott 
ed., 1939). 
21. Id. 
22. See James Chappel, Slaying the Leviathan: Catholicism and the Rebirth of European Conserva-
tism, 1920-1950 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with au-
thor). See also James Chappel, The Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism Theory in Interwar Europe, 8 
MODERN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 561, 561-90 (2011). 
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even National Socialism in Germany seem not like the wave of an exciting 
future but a relic of past mistakes. Seriously outnumbered in spite of shar-
ing many premises with their corporatist foes, civil society Catholics 
opened another path in the 1930s, which few took until later. Individual 
dignity emerged, essentially, as a marker on that path.  
Consider as an example of civil society dissidence Joseph Vialatoux’s 
speech to the Semaines Sociales in Lyon (an annual summer meeting of this 
faction), just at the time of the finalization of the Irish Constitution. It was 
titled “Dignity of the Group? Or of the Human Person?”23 “It may not be 
excessive,” Vialatoux commented, “to say that this very question defines 
the historical moment in which we live.”24 He inveighed against specifically 
biological and generally naturalistic approaches, which tended to view the 
human group as the locus of significance, arguing instead that Christianity 
brought the metaphysics of spirituality—which made the human person 
the site of dignity. Yet Vialatoux’s preference for individual dignity, it bears 
noting, did not at all connote the corollary of “human rights.” That revolu-
tionary concept, in spite of its ostensible priority of persons, remained in 
what Vialatoux called “bastard union” with “naturalist philosophy.” For 
this reason, it had elicited the equally erroneous sequels: the secular temp-
tation of liberal nationalism had swept Europe in the nineteenth century 
and now counterrevolution racism in the form of National Socialism had 
extended it in the twentieth. The “dignity of the human person” was to be a 
response to all these mistakes. It was now critical to assert dignity against 
the “depersonalized individual” of the secular liberalism associated with 
the French Revolution and the equally secular racist extremism that now 
sought to overturn it. Dignity would save the “person” buried in secular, 
and later revolutionary, politics from its own misguided proponents, and 
make it the foundation stone of a spiritual community rather than the mate-
rialist totalitarianism of communism and fascism alike.25 
Vialatoux posed his question whether to give individual or group dig-
nity priority in early 1937, but far from crying in the wilderness against to-
talitarianism, by summertime when he gave his lecture, it must have 
seemed like the individualist option had garnered the highest possible sup-
port: from the Pope himself. It was for this reason above all—and not be-
cause of the Irish constitution—that March 1937 was a great month for civil 
society Catholics. That month, stung by the failure of earlier overtures to-
wards and negotiations with Nazi Germany, Pope Pius XI condemned 
German incursion on church rights in “Mit brennender Sorge,” and a week 
later issued his stirring encyclical letter Divini redemptoris “on atheistic 
communism.” The dignity of the individual surged in world public dis-
                                                            
23. Joseph Vialatoux, Dignité du groupe? Ou de la personne humaine?: Physique et métaphysique de 
l’ordre des valeurs, in LA PERSONNE HUMAINE EN PÉRIL (Semaines Sociales de France, 1932) (Fr.). 
On Vialatoux, see Emmanuel Gabelieri, Catholicisme social et ‘métaphysique en action’: La pensée 
de J. Vialatoux, 10 THÉOPHILYON 2, 9, 9-43 (2004) (Fr.). 
24. Vialatoux, supra note 23. 
25. Id. at 123, 132-33. 
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course essentially due to Divini redemptoris. Interestingly, however, “digni-
ty” was basic only in the second, anticommunist encyclical letter. (Within 
Catholicism, encyclicals are major events, rooted in papal infallibility since 
its nineteenth century annunciation; they are always touchstones of Catho-
lic thought and widely received and discussed.)  
In fact, the failure to respect the dignity of the human person was re-
peatedly identified as communism’s central error for decades starting in 
March 1937. Communism, the text reads, “strips man of his liberty, robs 
human personality of all its dignity, and removes all the moral restraints 
that check the eruptions of blind impulse.”26 Simultaneously too authoritar-
ian and too liberatory, communism reduced man to matter and thus also 
interfered with the source of moral agency. That communism “denies the 
rights, dignity and liberty of human personality” thus mainly made it an 
affront to moral norms.27 Put differently, dignity offered an individualism 
that, far from atomizing humanity, offered the true first principle of com-
munity and society, for “each individual man in the dignity of his human 
personality < is supplied with all that is necessary for the exercise of his 
social functions.”28 It was thus not strange that in Irish hands, individual 
dignity connected with the common good and the theological virtues (like-
wise constitutionalized), since it shared in the consensus phobia of basing 
politics on an apparently destitute secular individualism. 
Ignored in the contemporary literature on “human dignity,” Divini re-
demptoris was epoch-making, for it gave the concept as an incident of indi-
viduals or persons by far its highest profile entry in world politics to that 
date. It also gave a lift to the civil society Catholics’ insistence that dignity 
did not exclusively attach to groups. And the crucial revisions of the Irish 
Constitution that led to the appearance of individual dignity in its preamble 
also occurred in this period—very precisely, in the immediate aftermath of 
the encyclical. This accidental coincidence forms the basis of my case about 
what dignity meant when it became an Irish touchstone, anticipating many 
later developments. 
 
4. IRELAND AND THE COMING OF RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The many historians of Ireland’s Constitution, notably the accom-
plished Dermot Keogh, have simply missed the relevance of its dignitarian 
turn. Unaware of Ireland’s comparative priority when it comes to dignity, 
they have therefore failed to place the document in international context to 
                                                            
26. POPE PIUS XI, DIVINI REDEMPTORIS (1937). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. On the encyclical in the larger context of the Church‟s anticommunist politics, see Giuli-
ana Chamedes, Reinventing Christian Europe: Vatican Diplomacy, Transnational Anticom-
munism, and the Erosion of the Church-State Divide, ch. 6 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Columbia University) (on file with author). 
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explain this priority.29 The Irish Constitution, of course, needs to be read in 
a number of contexts, of which international Catholic thought and politics, 
my focus, is merely one. But this context matters because the Irish Constitu-
tion registered an international development that would later mark the UN 
Charter and the Basic Law—and thus make possible everything that fol-
lowed based on their language. 
Éamon de Valera, Fianna Fáil party leader and, from 1932, new Irish 
prime minister, wrote the Irish Constitution. After brief and informal con-
sultation with a tiny group of advisers, he unveiled his handiwork in April 
1937 for approval. Though the wave of the Catholic future may well have 
seemed to be corporatist constitutionalism on the European Continent at 
this moment, the Irish Constitution clearly could not go there, in spite of the 
hopes of some Irish Catholic integralists consulted during the process. De 
Valera was not an enemy of democracy (and in any case it is doubtful Great 
Britain would allowed him to take Ireland down the Spanish and Portu-
guese road), but he did help bring about a new kind of democracy. An eva-
nescent movement of Irish fascists trumpeting Catholic principle, known as 
the Blueshirts, rose and fell in the mid-1930s, and around the same time as 
the Constitution was in preparation, Paddy Belton’s fearsomely reactionary 
militant group, the Irish Christian Front, emerged.30 But de Valera had no 
truck with these groups, nor with any other version of undemocratic corpo-
ratism. 
Indeed, the primary impulse for engineering a new constitutional pro-
cess was a negative one. De Valera had long since committed himself to 
scuttling the Constitution of the Irish Free State of 1922 in the name of a 
new order. That the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 had not allowed Ireland full 
sovereignty, and that the first Irish constitution imposed a galling loyalty 
oath to the British crown (which de Valera deleted immediately in 1933), 
gave them so repulsive a stigma as to make them unsalvageable.31 The 
happenstance that the drafting of de Valera’s long-sought replacement of 
the unacceptable text with a new one occurred in the winter and spring of 
1936-37 proved consequential for the history of dignity, however. The pro-
cess replaced a document of the “new constitutionalism” (and the earlier 
era of progress Mirkine-Guetzévitch celebrated) with a very different con-
stitutional affair. 
The Irish Constitution was not just a “negative” success after all. The 
country’s move beyond its prior dominion constitution to assert its “right-
ful independence” reflected Catholic social thought in its positive outlook 
in a series of ways, and not surprising given the centrality of Catholicism to 
                                                            
29. See, e.g., DERMOT KEOGH AND ANDREW J. MCCARTHY, THE MAKING OF THE IRISH 
CONSTITUTION 1937: BUNREACHT NA HÉIREANN (1997) (striking for its inattention to the pream-
ble). See also V.T.H. Delaney, The Constitution of Ireland: Its Origins and Development, 12 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 1, 1-26 (1957). 
30. FEARGHAL MCGARRY, IRISH POLITICS AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR ch. 4 (1999). 
31. See generally LEO KOHN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE (1934). For de Valera‟s 
views, see, for example, Ronan Fanning, Mr. De Valera Drafts a Constitution, in DE VALERA‟S 
CONSTITUTION AND OURS 34 (Brian Farrell ed., 1988). 
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Irish nationalism in the 1930s and long after.32 A devoted Catholic passion-
ately committed to the greater presence of the country’s dominant religion 
in the constitution, de Valera was above all a politician. He deftly maneu-
vered to take account of the views of the episcopacy and various Catholic 
authorities while also assuming final control of the details of drafting. In 
particular, de Valera saw the preamble as the place to achieve symbolic 
Christianization of the document, while specific articles—notably on church 
and state, family, and property—would offer a considerable incorporation 
(though not total lock) of Catholic social thought into Irish politics. In this 
approach, de Valera may have been more canny than most comparative 
scholars of constitutions, who regularly slight preambles, though they are 
the most meaningful and memorable parts of founding texts to citizens.33 
In the preamble and in general, de Valera never wanted to go, nor 
could go, as far as reactionary or even doctrinally conservative Catholics 
desired.34 The constitutionalization of the freedom and dignity of the indi-
vidual, in short, can be taken above all as a symbol of de Valera’s larger 
balancing act crafting a Christian Democratic synthesis throughout the 
document. In an era of the victory of Catholic corporatism or outright fas-
cism, Ireland proved a peripheral laboratory of civil society Catholicism or 
                                                            
32. In a recent piece on another subject, historian Perry Anderson makes the following perti-
nent (though perhaps outrageous) comparative remarks:  
In the history of 20th-century nationalism, there is a distinct sub-group in which religion 
played a central organising role from the start, providing so to speak the genetic code of the 
movement. The most significant cases are those which eventually founded stable parliamen-
tary democracies. The three leading states of this type in the world today are Ireland, Israel 
and India. In all three, the nationalist party that came to power after independence—Fine Gael, 
Mapai, Congress—distanced itself from the confessional undertow of the struggle without ev-
er being able to tackle its legacy head-on. In each case, as the ruling party gradually lost its lus-
tre, it was outflanked by a more extreme rival that had fewer inhibitions about appealing di-
rectly to the theological passions aroused by the original struggle: Fianna Fail, Likud, BJP. The 
success of these parties was due not just to the faltering of the first wave of office-holders, but 
to their ability to articulate openly what had always been latent in the national movement, but 
neither candidly acknowledged nor consistently repudiated. They could claim, with a certain 
justice, to be legitimate heirs of the original cause. In each case, the setting was a parliamentary 
system, in which they operated constitutionally, if in each case with certain prewar sympathies 
for European fascism. . . . The Irish reversion came within a decade of independence—its carri-
er was the genuinely more popular and radical wing of the national movement, with the 
greatest anti-colonial legitimacy—and enjoyed the longest ascendancy, only finally collapsing 
last year.  
Perry Anderson, After Nehru, 34 LONDON REV. BOOKS 21 (2012). 
33. In an exception to this generalization, Mark Tushnet in fact mentions the Irish preamble as 
a good example of “expressive constitutionalism.” See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Com-
parative Constitutional Law, 106 YALE L.J. 1225, 1273 (1999). 
34. “„De Valera had little to nothing in common with the authoritarian Catholic leaders of the 
1930s,‟” Keogh remarks, a bit apologetically. „He did not make a fetish out of religion like the 
„monkish‟ Salazar of Portugal. He was repelled by the extremism of General Francisco Franco‟s 
cruzada. De Valera exhibited none of the demagoguery practised by the Central European 
Catholic dictators of the 1930s. . . . [He was] both patriotic and loyally Roman Catholic, but in a 
very independent way.‟” Dermot Keogh, Church, State, and Society, in DE VALERA‟S 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 31, at 104. But he had even less in common with socialists and com-
munists, who offered the main alternative in many Catholic countries to religious authoritari-
anism, until they were brutally suppressed. 
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even post-World War II Christian Democracy. Dignity now meant more 
than the anticommunist politics of Divini redemptoris, for de Valera’s regis-
tration of the dignitarian individualist, rather than simply the dignitarian 
corporatist strand of political Catholicism of the moment, encapsulated this 
broader stance towards the place of religion in politics and the availability 
of a third-way religious constitutionalism. Negotiating between forsaken 
secular liberalism and ascendant Catholic reaction, it offered religiously-
inflected conservative democracy. This project powerfully marked the 
emergence of constitutional dignity. Illustratively, when Oakeshott con-
cluded his compilation of sources on “Catholicism” as a free-standing op-
tion in European political thought in 1939, he reprinted the Irish Constitu-
tion’s preamble and most revealing articles.35 
Comparing de Valera’s constitution with the 1922 predecessor he patri-
otically scuttled makes this graphically clear. The earlier document had 
very much been in the spirit of the liberal “new constitutionalism” of the 
immediate moment after World War I in its attitudes to church and state, 
religious pluralism, and gender. Its 1937 replacement was a Christianizing 
document of a “newer” constitutionalism of religious democracy.36 Its ap-
proach to property, for example, drew substantially on Quadragesimo anno, 
while its article on religion acknowledged the Catholic Church’s “special 
position.” Its article on family and gender perhaps went furthest in qualify-
ing the secular liberalism of the prior constitutional exercise. 
Irish feminists, agitating for the group most obviously affected by such 
changes, responded to its consequences immediately and with outrage. The 
new draft constitution deleted the existing constitution’s promise of equal 
rights without distinction to sex, which feminists feared might even strip 
women of the hard-won vote. (They succeeded in restoring the clause in 
ratification debates.) And as ratified, the constitution’s controversial Article 
41 enshrined a traditionalist vision of the family. On a symbolic level, the 
article made clear that whatever the dignity of persons meant, it was insep-
arable from the natural priority and social centrality of families, which in 
turn depended on women’s “life within the home.” More substantively, the 
article constitutionally prohibited divorce, a prohibition lifted only six dec-
ades later in the constitution’s fifteenth amendment.37 
                                                            
35. Oakeshott, supra note 20, at 72-77. 
36. Noel Browne, Church and State in Modern Ireland, in IRELAND‟S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION, 
1937-97: COLLECTED ESSAYS 46-47 (Tim Murphy & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998). 
37. See Maria Luddy, A ‘Sinister and Retrogressive’ Proposal: Irish Women’s Opposition to the 1937 
Draft Constitution, 15 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 175-95 (2005). We are 
not far here from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “The family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.” Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16(3), UN Doc. A1810 at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948). It is true 
that Ireland never took up the fully maternalist turn of other places where Catholic social 
thought was enacted as authoritarian policy in the era. For comparison‟s sake, see FRANCINE 
MUEL-DREYFUS, VICHY AND THE ETERNAL FEMININE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLITICAL 
SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER part 3 (Kathleen A. Johnson, trans., 2001). For how de Valera and others 
squared these views with the immediately preceding provision on equality, Art. 40(1), with its 
allusion to equality of “human persons” drawn from contemporary Catholic social thought, 
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5. RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTIONALISM BETWEEN DRAFTING AND RATIFICATION 
Thanks to recent publications, it is relatively easy to chart the formation 
of the preamble’s allusion to “the dignity and freedom of the individual.”38 
De Valera clearly saw the preamble doing essentially symbolic work, unlike 
the body of articles potentially justiciable in courts (including in constitu-
tional review).39 The comparatively uncontroversial preamble nonetheless 
underwent its own evolution. 
A Jesuit Committee set up in late 1936 with de Valera’s permission, led 
intellectually by Father Edward Cahill and basing its text primarily on the 
1921 Polish Constitution, offered large parts of the surviving preamble.40 
Cahill, founder of the modest Irish branch of Catholic Action (An Rí-
oghacht) that elsewhere became strongly linked to civil society Catholicism, 
had definite views about the dominant role Catholicism should play in the 
drafting process and threw himself into his task. For him and his yet more 
conservative colleague Dennis Fahey, the Catholic prophylaxis against 
modern evils—from liberalism to communism, spread by Protestants, Jews, 
and freemasons —needed to provide the packaging and the details of the 
new document. In his own social thought, Cahill promoted Quadragesimo 
anno and adopted a version of corporatism known as vocationalism.41 
However, even as late as the close of 1936, his main contribution occurred 
too early for him to inject individual dignity into the proceedings, and he 
did not mention it in his many communications with de Valera; moreover, 
the Polish document that provided a template for the Jesuits didn’t affiliate 
with the concept. 
As the process went on in spring, the draft constitutions that de Valera 
circulated to various circles from March 16, 1937 didn’t yet include the pre-
amble—with which de Valera and his staff appear, on the basis on the orig-
inal Jesuit suggestions, to have tinkered on their own throughout the peri-
                                                                                                                                          
see ORAN DOYLE, CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY LAW 56-60 (2004). 
38. IRISH CONSTITUTION (1937). I rely largely here on the new archival compilation, THE 
ORIGINS OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 1928-1941 (Gerard Hogan ed., 2012), along with the Royal 
Irish Academy website at http://www.ria.ie/research/oic.aspx for further documents.  
39. For the original absence and later rise in enforceability of preambular language, see Teresa 
Iglesias, The Dignity of the Individual in the Irish Constitution: The Importance of the Preamble, 89 
STUDIES: IRISH Q. REV. 19, 19-34 (2000). 
40. Hogan, supra note 38, at 247. I note in passing that the Polish document does have a poten-
tial claim to be the first example of religious constitutionalism, especially given its role as Irish 
template fifteen years later, though there are arguments on the other side, making it more part 
of Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch‟s picture of a wave of liberal constitutionalism in the east after 
World War I. 
41. For his views in the early 1930s, which occasionally referenced dignity, see EDWARD 
CAHILL, THE FRAMEWORK OF A CHRISTIAN STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE 278-82, 
288, 455-56 (1932); THE SOCIAL RIGHTS OF OUR DIVINE LORD JESUS CHRIST, THE KING (Dennis 
Fahey, trans., 1932). Both are highly critical of “liberalism” in the name of Catholic politics. See 
also Seán Faughnan, The Jesuits and the Drafting of the Irish Constitution of 1937, 26 IRISH 
HISTORICAL STUDIES 79, 101 (1988). 
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od. Three days after the first rough draft, Divini redemptoris was issued to 
wide global reception, including in Ireland, and especially in The Irish Press, 
the newspaper de Valera had helped found.42 There is no better evidence 
than this matter of timing that the encyclical inspired the insertion of digni-
ty. At this point, de Valera may have made the crucial revisions on his own, 
or with the advice of John Charles McQuaid, then president of Blackrock 
College (later Dublin’s archbishop), and de Valera’s close contact in this de-
cisive period.43 In any event, when de Valera met on April 3, 1937 with the 
Pope’s ambassador or nuncio, he showed him a draft of a preamble invok-
ing “the dignity and freedom of the citizens.”44 By April 11, in new docu-
ments sent to the papal nuncio, the preamble’s phrase had assumed its final 
form—an important revision since to restrict dignity to “citizens” might 
seem to ignore its natural foundations and thus its role in constraining the 
state.45 
No evidence I have seen contains any discussion of, let alone dispute 
around, these changes—an unsurprising fact given that the dignity clause is 
much more important in retrospect than it was at the time. (Often what lat-
er seems like an extraordinary departure occurs without fanfare.) But the 
documentation is rich enough to provide a clear sense of the timing of the 
constitutionalization of dignity, in the immediate aftermath of Divini re-
demptoris, and thus provides the clue to what it meant. Its linkage with con-
stitutionalism, however, could not help but associate individual dignity 
with a new sort of political enterprise. Religious change in recent decades 
has left de Valera open to constant and severe criticism for how far Catholic 
social thought about the role and rights of families, education, property, 
and the Church itself impacted his vision. At the time, however, de Valera 
worried most—and rightly so—about disappointing his most fervent Cath-
olic advisers. 
In particular, even as feminist complaints were marginalized, a huge 
dispute swirled throughout this period (and indeed long after) around the 
wording of Article 44, which Cahill and others wanted to name “the Catho-
lic Church as the true Christian Church.” But in spite of his own apparent 
                                                            
42. The Press was also the paper closest to de Valera‟s Fianna Fáil, and covered the encyclical 
on its front page. Deceived into Aiding Communism—These Will Be Its First Victims, Says the Su-
preme Pontiff, IRISH PRESS, Mar. 19, 1937; see also Holy Father Denounces Communism, IRISH 
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 19, 1937; Communism Assailed, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 19, 1937. 
43. JOHN COONEY, JOHN CHARLES MCQUAID: RULER OF CATHOLIC IRELAND 96-97 (2000). See 
generally id. at ch. 8, which overstates McQuaid‟s role generally but rightly gives him special 
importance with respect to the preamble. McQuaid also gave de Valera a copy (which he read) 
of the summary of Catholic social teaching originating from the neo-Scholastic circles around 
Belgian Cardinal Désiré-Joseph Mercier, which invokes “the eminent dignity of the human 
person,” but this appears to have occurred somewhat earlier, so the preambular changes seem 
to me best explained by the timing and prominence of the encyclical. See UNION 
INTERNATIONALE D‟ÉTUDES SOCIALES, LE CODE SOCIAL: ESSAI D‟UNE SYNTHÈSE SOCIALE 
CATHOLIQUE 30 (1927, 1934) (Fr.); cf. FRANK LONGFORD & THOMAS O‟NEILL, EAMON DE VALERA 
296 (1971). 
44. Hogan, supra note 38, at 449 (Document 123, April 3, 1937). 
45. Id. at 462 (Document 135, April 11, 1937). 
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sympathies, de Valera ultimately understood he could not do so, setting out 
to balance Catholicism’s preeminence with acknowledgment of minority 
faiths and religious freedom.46 It was, after all, a country with a Protestant 
population of twenty-five percent (if one included the contested north, 
which the constitution claimed as part of the nation). Article 44 illustrated, 
once again, that the larger constitutional effort balanced between compet-
ing extremes of secular liberalism and religious authoritarianism. 
It also caused no little difficulty for de Valera in his search for ecclesias-
tical imprimatur. In mid-April, two weeks before unveiling his handiwork 
to the public, he sent his emissary Joseph Walshe to Rome for endorsement. 
But Eugenio Pacelli, then-Vatican Secretary of State communicating for the 
already sick pontiff whom he would succeed two years later, refused to 
comply. Pacelli reminded Walshe that failure to acknowledge the Catholic 
Church as the true one was technically heretical, though Pacelli said he 
grasped that de Valera felt his situation forced him into theological error. 
“Ni approvo ni non disapprovo; taceremo” (I don’t approve, but I also don’t 
disapprove; I will remain silent), Pacelli told Walshe in the Pope’s name. 
This was nonetheless a crushing result for de Valera, who had striven to 
explain to Rome that he was constrained by the fact of his Protestant minor-
ity from the more full-blown Catholic ideal he personally desired for the 
document. “It did not shake him when I contrasted the expressly Christian 
character of our new Constitution with the liberalism (continental sense) of 
the old,” Walshe reported back glumly.47 
De Valera thus didn’t go as far as some of his Catholic advisers and ec-
clesiastical authorities desired. But he did intend the Irish Constitution to 
mark the appearance of a new sort of Christian state, and the preamble in 
which dignity now appeared had a special role here. In the pained negotia-
tions with the Vatican, dignity didn’t come up and wasn’t enough to con-
vince Pius XI (or the future Pius XII, speaking in his name) to sign off. 
Nonetheless, when in the ratification process some months later de Valera 
faced unexpected opposition to the constitution for its excessive secularism 
(rather than its excessive confessionalism), the Christian credentials of dig-
nity proved helpful. In spite of the Pope’s earlier reluctance, the Vatican 
newspaper, L’Osservatore Romano, providentially seemed to endorse the 
constitution. “It differs from other constitutions,” it noted, in an affirmation 
reported by the Irish Press that had a large impact in satisfying the religious 
                                                            
46. No anti-Semite, unlike a great many Catholics at the time, de Valera was in fact on excep-
tionally friendly terms with Ireland‟s chief rabbi through 1936, Isaac Herzog, who once shel-
tered the future statesman when he was being pursued by authorities as a terrorist. Herzog, 
who then became the chief rabbi of Palestine (and later Israel), so admired de Valera‟s reli-
gious nationalism—including his 1937 constitution—that he often cited both as potential mod-
els for Jews in the face of a then-dominant secular nationalism. See SHULAMIT ELIASH, THE 
HARP AND THE SHIELD OF DAVID: IRELAND, ZIONISM AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL 49-70 (2007); 
DERMOT KEOGH, JEWS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY IRELAND: REFUGEES, ANTISEMITISM, AND THE 
HOLOCAUST 77, 110 (1998). For the latest word on the startling contiguity of Catholicism and 
racism in the era, see JOHN CONNELLY, FROM ENEMY TO BROTHER: THE REVOLUTION IN 
CATHOLIC TEACHING ON THE JEWS, 1933-1965 ch. 1-3 (2012). 
47. Hogan, supra note 38, at 506 (Document 155, April 22, 1937). 
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vote, “because it is inspired by respect for the faith of the people, the digni-
ty of the person, the sanctity of the family, of private property, and of social 
democracy. These principles are applied in a unique religious spirit, which 
animates the whole constitution.”48 It seems that Ireland’s pioneering ven-
ture in a newer constitutionalism, in which individual dignity came to the 
fore, was generally understood in these terms by its friends as well as by its 
critics.49 
 
6. FROM THE IRISH CONSTITUTION TO THE BASIC LAW 
That some Catholics sought an alternative to authoritarian and fascist 
solutions by appealing to individual human dignity in these years, of 
course, doesn’t at all mean that the faltering republics of Europe were gen-
erally defended in their terms. It simply means that some Catholics hewed 
out a conceptual possibility that was to have an unlikely fate in later history 
(up to and including our era). Liberals like Mirkine-Guetzévitch didn’t 
frame their republicanism in dignitarian terms, either before or after World 
War II. Further, through the war just a few Catholics believed that alle-
giance to “human dignity” entailed allegiance to “human rights,” which 
most Catholics following modern popes still considered the baleful child of 
the French Revolution and secularist evil, and which Catholics under au-
thoritarian regimes were commanded to spurn. Indeed Catholic thinker 
Jacques Maritain, chief theoretician of civil society Catholicism and later 
premier interpreter of the Universal Declaration, didn’t connect dignity to 
“human rights” until 1942 at the earliest.50 
But between 1942 and 1945, as the Allied war effort after Stalingrad 
looked forward to its ultimate triumph, more and more Catholics in general 
linked “the dignity of the human person” hewed out in the prior decade to 
“human rights.” Pius XI had not ceased the rhetoric of dignity before his 
death. “Christian teaching alone gives full meaning to the demands of hu-
man rights and liberty because it alone gives worth and dignity to human 
personality,” the New York Times reported him saying in late 1938—a nearly 
                                                            
48. See DERMOT KEOGH, THE VATICAN, THE BISHOPS, AND IRISH POLITICS 1919-1939 at 219 (1986) 
(quoting an Irish Press article from May 17, 1937). 
49. Cf. Arthur W. Bromage & Mary C. Bromage, The Irish Constitution: A Discussion of Its Theo-
retical Aspects, 2 REV. POLITICS 145, 145-66 (1940). Certainly the document went far enough as to 
allow disputes to swirl for many decades around the degree to which Ireland had made natu-
ral law a constraint on democratic choices as well as judicial interpretation. Consider Vincent 
Grogan, The Constitution and the Natural Law, 7 CHRISTUS REX 201, 201-18 (1954); Declan Costel-
lo, The Natural Law and the Irish Constitution, 45 STUDIES 403, 403-14 (1956); JOHN MAURICE 
KELLY, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE IRISH LAW AND CONSTITUTION 38-45 (1961). 
50. See DANIELE LORENZINI, JACQUES MARITAIN E I DIRITTE UMANI: FRA TOTALITARISMO, 
ANTISEMITISMO, E DEMOCRAZIA (1936-1951) (2012) (Ital.). Incidentally, in wartime exile Maritain 
and Mirkine-Guetzévitch became friends in New York City, and the former even claimed at 
the latter‟s memorial to have sponsored his conversion. See Maritain, Ceux qui nous consolent 
d’appartenir à la race humaine, in HOMMAGE À B. MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH, supra note 9, at 99 (Fr.). 
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exact anticipation of the Universal Declaration’s formula ten years later.51 
Even while remaining publicly silent on de Valera’s constitution, Pius XII 
said similar things, in tune with Divini redemptoris, both before and after his 
election as Pope.52 But in wartime, his public claims about human dignity 
accelerated to a striking degree. In his high-profile Christmas message to 
the world for 1942, Pius XII offered five principles to inform a future peace, 
of which “the dignity of the human person” was the very first. Such war-
time invocations provided a bridge between what might otherwise have 
been a passing peculiarity of a few dissident theorists, along with the Irish 
Constitution, and the postwar trajectory of the concept. 
Thanks to Pius XII, in fact, individual dignity became incredibly com-
mon stuff across the Atlantic during the later phases of World War II, 
though much more work remains to be done to excavate wartime percola-
tion. Heroically, those few who joined French Resistance on Catholic prin-
ciple to criticize the Vichy regime’s popular claim to restore religious mo-
rality and civilization found in human dignity authority for human rights.53 
To take another of sundry examples, Edmund A. Walsh, American Jesuit 
(and founder of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service that 
still bears his name), wrote in 1942:  
The conflict is between the rights of individual men, endowed with 
the dignity of the human personality and elevated to the adopted 
sonship of God, on the one side, and the dehumanized, totalitarian 
state of Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke, Nietzsche, Hitler and the Tanaka 
Memorial of Japan on the other. This means not a world campaign 
of conventional belligerents [but] a World Revolution seeking to 
capture the soul of humanity.54  
How many people understood the global conflict as a crusade for dig-
nity is unclear, but Catholics on the right side often did. 
As in interwar debates, dignity in such usages carried with it a com-
munitarian and religious streak intended to distinguish it from the secular-
ism of nineteenth-century liberalism. Writing in Fortune magazine shortly 
after discovering the contiguity of dignity and rights, Maritain castigated 
                                                            
51. Pope Bids Church to Guard Man’s Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1938. 
52. See Lettre de S. Ém. le Cardinal Pacelli, in LA PERSONNE HUMAINE EN PÉRIL, supra note 23, 
which has a section on the “Natural Dignity of the Person.” He also connected the notion with 
rights: “a vast and dangerous conspiracy,” he insisted, threatens unlike any prior occasion “the 
inviolability of the human person that, in his sovereign wisdom and infinite goodness, the 
Creator has honored with an incomparable dignity. … [I]f a society adopted the pretense that 
it could diminish the dignity of the human person in refusing it all or some of the rights that 
come to it from God, it would miss its goal.” Id. at 5-8. 
53. See Renée Bédarida, Dans la tourmente 1940-1944: Des droits de la personne aux droits de 
l’homme, in LES CATHOLIQUES FRANÇAIS ET L‟HÉRITAGE DE 1789 at 206-10 (Pierre Colin ed., 1989) 
(Fr.) (noting that the concrete difficulty for Catholics in the Resistance was alliance with the 
dominant communists which “human dignity” had meant condemning shortly before). 
54. See PATRICK MCNAMARA, A CATHOLIC COLD WAR: EDMUND A. WALSH, S.J., AND THE 
POLITICS OF AMERICAN ANTICOMMUNISM 114 (2005). 
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modern man for “claim*ing+ human rights and dignity—without God, for 
his ideology grounded human rights and human dignity in a godlike, infi-
nite autonomy of human will.”55 But he now referred to the apparently al-
ternative “concept of, and devotion to, the rights of the human person” as 
“the most significant political improvement of modern times.”56 By the time 
of Pius XII’s exceptionally influential Christmas message to the world in 
1944, human dignity in a similarly invidious conception teemed to a degree 
completely unprecedented even by prior papal exhortation. 
A telos for and check on democracy, and a commitment that would 
save it from leveling equality and secularizing materialism, the dignity of 
the human person in fact became one of Pius XII’s key slogans for good. By 
late wartime, with authoritarian corporatism (or outright fascism) both 
outmoded, dignity for Pius XII implied conservative democracy to keep 
communist or even liberal politics at bay and to make Christian moral 
norms central. “The holy story of Christmas proclaims this inviolable digni-
ty of man with a vigor and authority that cannot be gainsaid—an authority 
and vigor that infinitely transcends that which all possible declarations of 
the rights of man could achieve,” the Pope observed.57 True Christian de-
mocracy would protect human dignity, he warned. False democracy, by 
contrast, would sacrifice it on the profane altar of secularism, materialism, 
and relativism, subordinating the natural law and common good to the 
whims of the masses, exaggerating defensible liberty into appetitive license, 
and accelerating acceptable equality into colorless uniformity—all traves-
ties of human dignity rather than its enthronement. Continental Western 
Europe followed this advice after World War II, with re-stabilization occur-
ring under the auspices of conservative democracy, supervised by a new 
sort of Christian political party, with Catholics in the lead.58 For a long time, 
dignity summarized these developments in a single term. The Irish Consti-
tution, in spite of its initially accidental and local breakthrough, was thus a 
premonitory document of the direction political Catholicism would eventu-
ally take after guns decided the larger direction of history.59 
                                                            
55. Jacques Maritain, Christian Humanism, FORTUNE 106 (Apr. 1942). 
56. Id. 
57. Pius XII, True and False Democracy, MAJOR ADDRESSES 88 (Vincent Yzermans ed., 2d vol. 
1961). Pius XII‟s further comment that “democracy, taken in the broad sense, admits of various 
forms, and can be realized in monarchies as well as in republics,” id. at 80, might suggest a 
somewhat idiosyncratic understanding of the term, except that political theorists like Maritain 
agreed that what made a regime democratic was not formal structure but whether the natural 
law was respected and the common good achieved through it. 
58. For the best general account, see Martin Conway, Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The 
Triumph of a Political Model, 32 EUROPEAN HISTORY Q. 59-84 (2002); JAN-WERNER MUELLER, 
CONTESTING DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL IDEAS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE ch. 4 (2011). 
59. The continuity or “transwar” thesis I offer is thus radically different from Whitman‟s un-
convincing proposal that the Nazi concern with honor flowed into post-World War II appeals 
to human dignity. Allowing a more plausible view about long-term social trends in status to 
explain specific events and short-term political and legal phenomena it doesn‟t fit, Whitman 
also neglects the rather important fact that the Nazis had no actual discourse of human digni-
ty, where transnational Christians did, and massively so, across the same era. James Q. Whit-
man, On Nazi ‘Honour’ and the New European ‘Dignity’, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: 
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It was mainly papal usage that proved of most direct relevance to 
postwar affairs—the bridge from the late 1930s to the late 1940s. Arguably, 
even the U.N. Charter registered the papal usage, for there is no other obvi-
ous source. As political theorist Charles Beitz has lately discovered, it was 
Barnard College dean Virginia Gildersleeve, in her cosmetic changes made 
to South African politician Jan Smuts’s draft of the preamble to the U.N. 
Charter in 1945, who singlehandedly introduced the allusion to “the dignity 
and worth of the human person.” But it is self-evident that the prominence 
of this notion in wartime, including its connection to rights, was due to the 
Pope more than all others.60 
Not surprisingly, when conservative democracy came to postwar Ger-
many and elsewhere, dignity could now have a crucial role in constitutions 
that—like Ireland’s before them—were grounded on the Christian God and 
human dignity together, as first principles of a new sort of constitutional 
regime. This gesture occurred in Germany in the form of the several sub-
federal Länder constitutions before it was repeated in the Basic Law of the 
new federal republic. Unlike Austria, which restored the post-World War I 
liberal constitution Hans Kelsen had drafted, West Germany and Western 
Europe generally were allowed by the Allies (especially the Americans) to 
go another way. First both in time and significance was the absolutely criti-
cal Bavarian Constitution of 1946, whose preamble, written personally by 
Christian Democrat Alois Hundhammer, began as follows: “Mindful of the 
physical devastation which the survivors of the 2nd World War were led 
into by a godless state and social order lacking in all conscience or respect 
for human dignity. . . .”61  The conflict was clearly the immediate back-
ground in the mind of framers of the German documents—even if the Hol-
ocaust of European Jewry was clearly not. But constitutions are always also 
prospective blueprints for rule, and in the Bavarian Constitution, God, dig-
                                                                                                                                          
THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 243 (Christian 
Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003). See also Gerald Neuman, On Fascist Honour and 
European Dignity: A Sceptical Response, in id. at 264 (a brief rejoinder to Whitman). 
60. Charles Beitz, Human Dignity and Human Rights (manuscript on file with author); see also 
Christopher McCrudden, Dignity and the Judicial Interpretation of Rights, 19 EUROPEAN J. INT‟L L. 
655, 675-78 (2008). No American sources, in particular, conjoin human dignity and human 
rights earlier than or outside the framework of the Catholic sources mentioned above, and in 
the Pope‟s widely circulating language above all. For documentation of Gildersleeve‟s deep-
seated anti-Semitism, defeating initial intuitions about why she might have thought it im-
portant to add dignity at the end of World War II, see STEPHEN H. NORWOOD, THE THIRD 
REICH IN THE IVORY TOWER: COMPLICITY AND CONFLICT ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES 104-05, 130, 
236 (2009). 
61. VERFASSUNG DES FREISTAATES BAYERN, Dec. 2, 1946, available in English at 
www.bayern.landtag.de/fileadmin/scripts/get_file/Bavarian_Const_2003_13F.pdf. On 
Hundhammer‟s role, and his participation in then dominant religious appeals to natural law, 
see OLIVER BRAUN, KONSERVATIVES EXISTENZ IN DER MODERNE: DAS POLITISCHE WELTBILD 
ALOIS HUNDHAMMERS, 1900-1974 at 318-20, 282-310 (2006) (Ger.). For a more general picture of 
the impact of Catholicism on constitutional origins, see BURKHARD VON SCHEWICK, DIE 
KATHOLISCHE KIRCHE UND DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER VERFASSUNGEN IN WESTDEUTSCHLAND 1945-
1950 (1980) (Ger.). I reserve further writing on the origins of the Grundgesetzt for later. See, e.g., 
CHRISTOPH GOOS, “INNERE FREIHEIT”: EINE REKONSTRUKTION DES GRUNDGESETZLICHEN 
WÜRDEBEGRIFFS (2012) (Ger.).  
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nity, and morality were intended to play a special role, much like in Ireland 
before. As much or more influenced by Christian Democratic thinking, the 
Italian Constitution (1947)—before the Grundgesetzt and Universal Declara-
tion—likewise includes both dignity and “the human person,” though not 
in its preamble or as its first article. It also constitutionally preserved the 
fascist-era Lateran Treaty with the Holy See, whose provisions concerning 
religion and public life continue to be at stake in current controversy.62 
Germany in 1949 was part of a trend, found wherever Christian Democracy 
was strong (and exclusively there for a long time), to found new republics 
on—and limit them through—the morality of dignity. (Mirkine-Guetzévitch 
did not note it, but the strong presence of Christian Democrats in the 
French constituent assembly allowed the preamble of both the abortive 
April and final November 1946 constitutions of the new Fourth Republic to 
begin with the human person. The constitutions, however, did not allude to 
God or dignity, and the country’s Christian Democrats, through their 
Mouvement républicain populaire party, did not take power as they had in 
the rest of Continental Western Europe.)63 
All things considered, the framework that human dignity provided 
human rights and liberal constitutionalism in and through the war is hard 
to greet as an uncomplicated breakthrough—if it was not a retrograde con-
cession. Human dignity mainly helped wrest both rights and constitutional-
ism from the heritage of the French Revolution specifically and from politi-
cal secularism generally, with which they had hitherto been associated in 
European history. Now the latter were represented in transatlantic public 
culture as easy stepping stones to totalitarianism. Just as World War II had 
seen strange bedfellows in a popular front to defeat fascism, after that alli-
ance fractured the Cold War united one-time enemies against a new threat, 
with fateful consequences for all concerned.64 
 
                                                            
62. See, e.g., Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (holding that state-mandated crucifixes in pub-
lic school classrooms were not in violation of the right to freedom of conscience). 
63. It begins: “Au lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres sur les régimes qui 
ont tenté d‟asservir et de dégrader la personne humaine . . .” (In the aftermath of the victory 
won by the free peoples over the regimes that strove to subjugate and degrade the human per-
son . . .”) (translation by author). RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, CONSTITUTION DU 27 OCTOBRE 1946, 
Préambule. For the MRP‟s role, see, e.g., ANDREW SHENNAN, RETHINKING FRANCE: PLANS FOR 
RENEWAL, 1940-1946 ch. 4-5 (1989). Also worth a look, though a more complicated case, is the 
South Korean constitution of 1948, in which dignity figures as well. 
64. Dignity‟s main role for a long time remained public and private Cold War rhetoric, not 
constitutionalism, as Westerners generally adopted Catholicism‟s understanding of the central 
failing of communism. A founding document of the American Cold War, NSC-68, states that 
the point of the struggle is the defense of human dignity. NAT‟L SEC. COUNCIL, NSC-68: 
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (Apr. 14, 1950). Harry S 
Truman agreed that “[b]oth religion and democracy are founded on one basic principle, the 
worth and dignity of the individual man and woman.” See WILLIAM INBODEN, RELIGION AND 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1960: THE SOUL OF CONTAINMENT 109, passim (2010) (detail-
ing wide-ranging evidence of human dignity in American Cold War discourse). For further 
details, see Giuliana Chamedes, Pius XII, Rights Talk, and the Dawn of the Religious Cold War, in 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Devin O. Pendas ed., 2013). 
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7. DID THE IRISH SAVE CIVILIZATION? THE CONTINUITY OF DIGNITY 
It’s not my claim that the Irish Constitution is important in itself. In-
deed, when Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch put out the forlorn 1938 revision of 
his handbook of European constitutions, he took the corporatist Austrian 
and Portuguese constitutions to be much more significant, since they broke 
fundamentally (rather than, as in the Irish compromise, partially) with sec-
ular and liberal democracy.65 The Irish Constitution matters not intrinsical-
ly but instrumentally: in the current enthusiasm over human dignity, it de-
cisively establishes both the right chronology and the “original meaning” of 
its constitutionalization in the circumstances of religious democracy. It is, as 
it were, like a tape recorder that, because it was on at the right time, cap-
tures the moment in which an accident happened that still determines our 
discourse. 
Needless to say, for the Catholic world and European politics generally, 
the Irish assignment of dignity to the individual human being in 1937—like 
the other tentative proposals of Christian Democracy at the time—certainly 
didn’t settle matters. That took a war, in which illiberal corporatism was 
taken off the table as an option for political Catholicism, with much blood 
spilled in the process. Though the survival of “clerico-fascist” Spain and 
Portugal for many decades allowed some diehards to cherish the flame of 
reactionary dignity. Dermot Keogh long ago proposed seeing de Valera as a 
pioneering “Christian Democrat.”66 The trouble with this otherwise illumi-
nating interpretation is that there was no Christian Democratic hegemony 
in Europe until after World War II—whose violence was required to open 
the possibility for its decades-long reign. But after it, de Valera’s originally 
eccentric and peripheral synthesis of Catholicism and democracy suddenly 
became modish, and individualist dignity became a more prevalent foun-
dation stone, in the West German Basic Law not least. Constitutional digni-
ty entered history as part of what became the unanticipated post-World 
War II supremacy of Christian Democracy—and more broadly as an aspect 
of the earliest version of religious constitutionalism since gone global. 
For looking around the world, no one could say that religious constitu-
tionalism is a thing of the past. Indeed, the Irish case, in which constitution-
al dignity was born, might cast troubling light on this now familiar phe-
nomenon. Some, it is true, laud religious constitutionalism on the grounds 
that it is an alternative to even less liberal politics as well as a transitional 
device towards even more liberal politics. Consider, for example, Jan-
Werner Müller’s suggestion that radical Islamism might follow the same 
path reactionary Catholicism once did thanks to Christian Democracy in 
theory and practice.67 In the European history from which such general 
principles are extrapolated, however, religious constitutionalism followed 
                                                            
65. BORIS MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH, LES CONSTITUTIONS DE L‟EUROPE NOUVELLE 49-54 (1938). 
66. DERMOT KEOGH, IRELAND AND EUROPE, 1918-1948 passim (1988). 
67. Jan-Werner Müller, Making Muslim Democracies, BOSTON REV., Nov. 2010. 
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and replaced secular constitutionalism; and it ultimately prospered com-
pared to fascist and authoritarian options thanks to the force of (somebody 
else’s) arms. More theoretically, it is difficult to contend that formal consti-
tutionalism is itself a causal factor of liberalization. When it comes to sur-
vival in the tempests of economic and political crisis, the twentieth-century 
record of constitutions—as Mirkine-Guetzévitch already knew—is definite-
ly mixed.68 And as the text of the new Hungarian constitutional preamble 
suggests, it is still the case that religious constitutionalism is a response to 
crisis: to this day one of its main functions is as a successor rather than a 
bridge to a more liberal regime.69 As for religious constitutionalism as a 
transitional device, the Christian Democratic examples suggest that it can 
work to stabilize “constitutional theocracy” for a long time.70 And if the 
passing of the Christian Democratic era of the post-World War II decades is 
a model (to the extent it has passed), it is one in which cultural seculariza-
tion, not constitutional politics, did the trick.71 
The crucible for human dignity that religious constitutionalism provid-
ed thus establishes a potentially troubling starting point. And starting 
points sometimes remain relevant—as the starting point of individual hu-
man dignity most certainly does, since the moralistic alternative it implies 
to secular freedom undoubtedly retains its salience in various quarters. (In 
U.S. history, for example, consider the uses of “dignity” in the Republican 
Party platform of 2012.)72 More generally, the functions and fate of the reli-
gious constitutionalism of the 1930s and since inspire little confidence that 
there is anything more to say for it than that there are worse alternatives. 
                                                            
68. See generally ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009). 
69. CONSTITUTION OF HUNGARY (2011), preamble (structurally very similar to the Irish case discussed 
here in its conjunction of Christianity and dignity). It is all there: the centrality of human digni-
ty, acknowledgment of “the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood,” along with the 
larger significance of “Christian Europe,” in a history back to St. Stephen. Most revealingly, 
there is a call for a return to morality after secularist (including in this case communist) incur-
sion: “after the decades of the twentieth century which led to a state of moral decay, we have 
an abiding need for spiritual and intellectual renewal.” Id. Dignity also occurs in Iraq‟s 2005 
constitution and Libya‟s interim constitution (in the preamble), likewise good examples of re-
ligious constitutionalism, though admittedly dignity is now part of the constitutional state of 
the art and one may infer little from its presence. 
70. As religious constitutionalism is not in current atlases of global constitutionalism, further 
work would clearly be needed to frame any general theory of it. Compare David S. Law & Mila 
Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1163-1257 
(2011) and THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS (Denis Galligan & Mila 
Versteeg eds., 2013). 
71. See Hugh McLeod, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (New York, 2007) for a start. 
72. In this document, dignity is used five times, twice in relation to abortion and why it is 
wrong (including because the practice offends “the dignity of women”), once in relation to 
heterosexual marriage and why it must remain exclusive, once in relation to the military and 
why it should not be the site of “social experimentation,” and once in relation to veterans. See 
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, WE BELIEVE IN AMERICA 13, 31, 33, 42, 44, available at 
http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf. For some 
thoughts on Anthony Kennedy‟s allusions to the “dignity of marriage” in the recent case of 
Windsor v. United States, see Samuel Moyn, Dignity in General and in American Constitutional 
Law, HUMANITY (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.humanityjournal.org/blog/2013/10/dignity-
general-and-american-constitutional-law.  
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To the extent human dignity still remains continuous with its origins, and 
one can endorse religious constitutionalism only faute de mieux, both should 
be treated with caution. As Mirkine-Guetzévitch might have contended, 
constitutional freedom and constitutional dignity have mostly had separate 
trajectories in history. In spite of their happenstance entanglement in the 
middle of the twentieth century, perhaps they could again. 
 
8. CONCEPTS AND CONTESTATION: THE DISCONTINUITY OF DIGNITY 
But what about the rather different connotations human dignity has 
come to have and thus the different role that it can play? For it is also true 
that, both in theory and practice, starting points explain less and less as 
time passes about the course of the struggles that occur in their terms, 
whether at the level of constitutional keywords or in politics generally. In 
the history of words and concepts, including constitutional ones, genesis 
certainly doesn’t account for use (let alone validity). And more than a half-
century on, dignity’s functions today are no longer fully controlled by its 
original deployments.  
It was unexpected secularization that ultimately occurred in Ireland 
(and Germany), which also had the tributary effect of making human digni-
ty open to new understandings. Those living under the regimes of the 
“newer constitutionalism” of Christian Democracy surely could depart 
from original meanings, and unquestionably did so as the post-World War 
II era wore on. In fact, in both Ireland and Germany, the huge influence of 
Catholicism on constitutional theory and practice has waned so substantial-
ly over the intervening decades that its founding centrality risks being for-
gotten or suppressed.73 In any event, it is fair to say that human dignity is 
no longer tightly, let alone exclusively, tethered to the framework of reli-
gious constitutionalism. 
In the end, therefore, my emphasis on religious constitutionalism not 
only acknowledges, but even insists that some rather recent account is re-
quired for the salience today of a very different version of human dignity.74 
In law, no doubt the wave of recent constitutions invoking human dignity, 
above all the South African constitution, is the main factor in the current 
preeminence of the concept. Famously, dignity in Germany was initially a 
nicht interpretierte These or strictly symbolic provision but German judges 
departed from this original understanding long ago, and the Irish story is 
                                                            
73. For the Irish case, see, for example, JOHN HENRY WHYTE, CHURCH AND STATE IN MODERN 
IRELAND, 1923-1970 ch. 11 (1971). For Catholicism in the early years of the Basic Law, see Hans 
Maier, Katholische Sozial- und Staatslehre und neuere deutsche Staatslehre, 93 ARCHIV DES 
ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 1, 1-36; FRIEDER GÜNTHER, DENKEN VOM STAAT HER: DIE 
BUNDESDEUTSCHE STAATSRECHTSLEHRE ZWISCHEN DEZISION UND INTEGRATION 1949-1970 (2004) 
(Ger.). 
74. For a good place to start on this problem, see Oliver Sensen, Human Dignity in Historical 
Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms, 10 EUROPEAN J. OF POL. THEORY 71, 71-
91 (2006). 
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roughly similar.75 Its role in judicial interpretation of old and new constitu-
tional law in turn excites considerable attention today. Connected with the 
sudden relevance of, and commentary on, international human rights law, 
dignity is much more free-floating and contested than at the start. Its almost 
required status in constitutions in the last two decades means that dignity 
opens up specific fora for interpretation around the world, even if this pro-
cess is potentially (though not necessarily) kept in boundaries by its concur-
rent interpretation in international human rights law. 
In the academy, the belated and surprising return of Kantianism to 
prestige contributed a great deal, to be sure, with the proviso that contem-
porary secular liberals claiming Kant’s mantle didn’t turn to the touchstone 
of dignity until very late in their revivalism. Kant accorded individual dig-
nity importance in his moral philosophy, but few of his followers have until 
recently. For most of the period since the 1940s, dignity was something like 
a proprietary Catholic concept, generally restricted to natural law circles.76 
Kantians before the recent present, both in their late nineteenth century 
guise with Hermann Cohen or late twentieth century guise with John 
Rawls, have not focused on it. Of the preeminent philosophers who have 
published a book, chapter, or article in the last few years on dignity, none 
featured or in most cases even mentioned it before then; the common asser-
tion of dignity’s immemorial theoretical presence simply does not fit with 
its strikingly meteoric rise. Preceded by Avishai Margalit (in The Decent So-
ciety), interventions by Seyla Benhabib (in Dignity in Adversity), Ronald 
Dworkin (in Justice for Hedgehogs, in which a central chapter is entitled 
“Dignity,” and the epilogue, “Dignity Indivisible”), Jürgen Habermas (in 
“The Concept of Human Dignity<”), George Kateb (in Human Dignity), 
Michael Rosen (in Dignity) and Jeremy Waldron (in Dignity, Rank, and 
Rights) all date from 2010-12.77 In international law, for a long time it was 
exclusively conservative naturalists in the guild, like Myres McDougal and 
especially Alfred Verdross (by far its most prominent promoter in Cold 
War international law anywhere), who organized their thought around 
                                                            
75. For judicial interpretation, see Iglesias, supra note 39; William Binchy, Dignity as a Constitu-
tional Concept, in THE IRISH CONSTITUTION: GOVERNANCE AND VALUES (Eoin Carolan and Oran 
Doyle eds., 2008). More broadly, see, for example, Paolo G. Carozza, Human Dignity in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind 
Dixon eds., 2011). 
76. Before recently, the main thinkers of note to explore (let alone advocate) dignity were con-
servatives. See, e.g., Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHILOSOPHY 251-71 (1976); Robert Spaemann, 
Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde, in MENSCHENRECHTE UND MENSCHENWÜRDE: HISTORISCHE 
VORAUSSETZUNGEN, SÄKULARE GESTALT, CHRISTLISCHES VERSTÄNDNIS (Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde and Robert Spaemann eds., 1987) (Ger.); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Die Menschen-
würde auf ihrem Weg von der Antike bis heute, 12 HUMANISTISCHE BILDUNG 95-107 (1988) (Ger.). 
77. Aside from already cited sources, see SEYLA BENHABIB, DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY: HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN TROUBLED TIMES (2011); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011); GEORGE 
KATEB, HUMAN DIGNITY (2011); and, most stylishly, AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 
(1996); Avishai Margalit, Human Dignity between Kitsch and Deification, 9 HEDGEHOG REVIEW 7-
19 (2007). Apparently the crucial pioneer in contemporary Anglo-American philosophical dis-
cussion is THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT‟S MORAL THEORY 
(1992). 
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human dignity.78 In great numbers, since then, liberal international lawyers 
have now turned to it, generally concurring in the same move that philoso-
phers have made towards Kantian thought as basic framework.79 
The priority that Kantianism has today in sometimes overlapping aca-
demic and legal circles occasionally prompts a wishful assumption about 
the constitutional presence of dignity. But just as the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not enact Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, as Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes famously put it, none of the early or perhaps even later consti-
tutions featuring human dignity incorporate Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals by reference—especially on a contemporary, secular 
interpretation of Kant that gives individuals strong autonomy and trump-
ing rights against state prerogative and collective goods. More generally, 
there is no historical evidence to support the proposition that constitutional 
dignity in its Christian Democratic guise reflects a commitment to deontol-
ogy in ethics. If it originally posed a bar, it was much more to democracy in 
the name of a posited anterior morality, to stave off the risk of the secular 
incursion or “totalitarian” expansion of the state. It is true that in Catholic 
social thought a utilitarian basis for policy calling for hedonic calculation 
was also anathema, but not because it preferred the autonomy of Kantian 
persons. It insisted on constraint on autonomy, individual as well as collec-
tive. Dignity thus did not originally portend now-current debates concern-
ing individual prerogatives versus collective goods—the distinction be-
tween which the notion of the “human person” was supposed to overcome.  
Though it certainly illustrates the plasticity of words and concepts, hu-
man dignity’s later trajectory in law and philosophy in a radically new di-
rection is not necessarily a satisfying one. For redeployment of words and 
concepts occurs through the muddying of multifarious contestation rather 
than the simplicity of first coinage. The struggle to redefine may make spe-
                                                            
78. See Myres S. McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, 53 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-36 (1959); Alfred 
Verdross, Die Würde des Menschen in der abendländischen Rechtsphilosophie, in NATURORDNUNG 
IN GESELLSCHAFT, STAAT, WIRTSCHAFT: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JOHANNES MESSNER (Joseph Höffner et 
al. eds., 1961) (Ger.); Die Wu  rde des Menschen als Grundlage der Menschenrechte, in RENÉ CASSIN: 
AMICORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER (1969) (Ger.); DIE WÜRDE DES MENSCHEN UND IHR 
VÖLKERRECHTLICHE SCHUTZ (1975) (Ger.). Verdross, a Viennese pupil of Kelsen‟s who turned 
to Catholic natural law, had been a loyal admirer of Dollfuss and ardent supporter of his re-
gime before becoming postwar Austria‟s greatest international lawyer. For how he overlooked 
the differences between his Christian nationalism and National Socialism in 1938, see Anthony 
Carty, Alfred Verdross & Othmar Spann: German Romantic Nationalism, National Socialism and In-
ternational Law, 6 EUROPEAN J. INT‟L L. 78-97 (1995). 
79. The exploding literature is too vast to cite. Louis Henkin didn‟t yet mention Kant or dignity 
in THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978). The next year, his partner Alice Henkin edited a volume 
of Aspen Institute proceedings entitled HUMAN DIGNITY: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1979), but no contributors mentioned dignity (or invoked Kant, except Judge 
Charles Wyzanski, Jr., who dismissed him as a statist proponent of positive liberty, id. at 13). 
Just a few years later, see Oscar Schachter‟s pioneering Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 
77 AM. J. INT‟L L. 77, 848-54 (1983). Later, Henkin‟s co-edited casebook HUMAN RIGHTS (1999, 
2009) makes both Kant and dignity central to the emergence of human rights in its historical 
section.  
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cial sense or even count as a requirement, of course, when keywords hap-
pen to have been embedded in authoritative legal documents like national 
constitutions and international treaties. Most notably, redefinition may be 
appropriate to the extent courts are willing to interpret key terms as of in-
dependent legal significance. Continuing redefinition of existing words as 
partisan struggle continues is a main business of politics and law. (After 
looking at the meanings of dignity on the Republican side, consider the al-
ternative uses in the Democratic Party platform for the 2012 American elec-
tions.)80 
It is true that stabilization of meaning can occur at any point but, espe-
cially when it comes to an open-textured term like “human dignity,” stabi-
lization is normally a partial and temporary achievement. And it is pre-
sumably easiest at the beginning rather than in an ongoing struggle for 
redefinition, for the same reason it is simplest to start with a blank canvas 
rather than attempt to alter an existing picture. The constitutional begin-
nings of individual human dignity were rather distinctive compared to the 
present time. At a very different historical moment than ours, it originally 
entered the world and constitutional politics as some Catholic actors strug-
gled to establish it as a valuable tool. The Irish Constitution, like the Ger-
man Basic Law that later followed it, seems to have been a moment of rela-
tive success in this regard. But such moments in which new words are 
constitutionalized, and with generally consensual implications, are rare. 
If so, then contestation is the bittersweet fate of all of the concepts and 
values that matter to us. And yet not all words and concepts are created 
equal in the sorts of disagreement that is their common lot. The inevitable 
process of dispute to which each word and concept must play host leads to 
different results, much like in Leo Tolstoy’s unhappy families. For often 
purely accidental reasons some concepts are open to moving in specific 
new directions, as when a mutation from one era of evolution happens 
connects to another at a later stage. Dignity, clearly, was open to specific re-
appropriation in part because of a new kind of international human rights 
law and an entirely unexpected academic Kantianism could make use of it. 
Further, for conceptual and historical reasons in different combinations, 
some words and concepts are very hard to move away from their inherited 
moorings, others very easy. But finally, some dissensus is so profound that 
it transcends ordinary disagreement, and the premise that the same concept 
is still under debate on different sides becomes a fiction obscuring the reali-
ty that interlocutors have simply parted ways. 
I myself worry that this last syndrome now besets “human dignity,” 
since given the facts of continuity with its origins and reappropriation of its 
                                                            
80. In this document, dignity is used six times, four times in relation to the universal human 
rights on which the United States (it says) was founded, including emphasis on global wom-
en‟s rights and global development, as well as twice in relation to liberal social policy like 
health care that affords all (and especially elderly) citizens dignity. See DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL 
COMMITTEE, MOVING AMERICA FORWARD 1, 2, 28, 29, 30, available at 
http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-platform/2012-National-Platform.pdf. 
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meaning since (along with its migration into domains from bioethics to 
counterterrorism), it is too controverted to be available not simply for pris-
tine use but even for useful invocation. Surprisingly given its constitutional 
origins as I have sketched them, Bruce Ackerman has recently elevated 
human dignity to a core principle of American constitutional law – surpris-
ingly, given that the first reference to it in any American jurisdiction oc-
curred in summer 1937 and in direct response to papal innovations.81 Any 
“stress” on “human dignity may surprise American constitutional law-
yers,” Ackerman acknowledges, going on nevertheless to claim its centrali-
ty to Brown v. Board of Education and the civil rights revolution as a whole:  
While the idea of dignity serves as the foundation of constitutional 
rights in Europe and elsewhere, American lawyers generally derive 
their basic principles from the ideas of equal protection and due 
process. [But t]his is a misconception—based on a failure to appre-
ciate how Brown’s lost logic was reinforced during the struggle for 
the landmark statutes of the 1960s.82 
Similarly, Reva Siegel contends that dignity briefly served as a tool to 
advance the autonomy and equality of women in the domain of sexuality, 
by making claims to it in the 1960s and 1970s in America and Germany to 
seek the decriminalization of abortion from judges.83 But whatever the his-
torical plausibility of these suggestions—and they are powerful—it is insuf-
ficient simply to pluck the version of dignity one prefers from the past as if 
others did not exist. For example, Ackerman offers a few examples of hu-
man dignity from popular and judicial arguments while failing to note the 
large avalanche of uses in Cold War discourse. And whatever is true about 
the past, controversy about the meaning of dignity rules now. For her part, 
Siegel helpfully acknowledges that the theoretical disarray and political 
dispute around human dignity today is so intense that the sole defense of 
its role available currently is on the slender grounds that it “keeps agonists 
in conversation.”84 Most obviously, both sides in ongoing abortion disputes 
invoke it. Yet if the common ground that dignity is supposed to provide 
them turns out to mean something completely different on inspection for 
each side, what exactly do they have to talk about? As Ackerman also right-
                                                            
81. Zurbrick v. Woodhead, 90 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1937). The next reference, four years later, even 
more revealingly shows the antitotalitarian connotations of the phrase; see Laage v. Laage, 26 
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1941). There are a small handful of earlier cases mentioning the “dignity of 
man.” 
82. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 137 (vol. 3, 2013). See 
also Bruce Ackerman, Dignity Is a Constitutional Principle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2014. 
83. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions under Ca-
sey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity 
in Transnational Debates over Abortion and Same-Sex Marriage, INT‟L J. CONST. L. 355-79 (2012). 
84. For these issues, see the crosstalk in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher 
McCrudden ed., 2014), where a shorter version of the present essay also appears. 
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ly concludes, “Dignity is a notoriously protean notion.”85 
Like an over-squeezed orange, the appeal to dignity may have no more 
to give to any side in struggle any longer. No concept is useful or useless 
until someone tries to use it and succeeds or fails; the trouble with dignity 
is not that it is useless in theory but that the practice of political combat has 
made it much more so.86 We can never know in advance, of course, who 
will win in politics, including the creative politics of constitutional or other 
legal interpretation. But we can worry that a word or principle seems to 
have no likely future except for that of fueling repetitious and redundant 
conflict. 
To the powerful objection that further mobilizations of dignity are inev-
itable—if only in order to push back against other interpretations of what it 
is said to require—any response has to concede that there is no alternative 
to living with some disagreement, and not least with respect to constitu-
tional terms, values, and precepts. It is not as if simply omitting dignity, 
were that possible, would leave utter agreement around some other words 
and values.87 But while it is true that each constitutional concept and provi-
sion is to some degree contested, if only by dint of its sheer presence and 
the passage of time, essentially contested concepts can give rise to pointless 
debate because they are based not on incompletely theorized agreement, 
which would allow continuing renegotiation, but are instead based on en-
tirely un-theorized disagreement concealing implacable antagonism. And 
not infrequently, in an era when the play of political forces is sometimes not 
mirrored precisely in the composition of legal or academic elites, such un-
viability is an invitation to struggle not for democratic victory but for ap-
parently easier control of judicial and theoretical meanings. To the extent 
more immediate results seem available at those levels, it is tempting to 
transfer politics there with little legitimacy and often only temporary suc-
cess.    
The worry is that “human dignity” is too frequently a depoliticizing 
concept, which risks obfuscating programmatic divergence under the pre-
tense of convergence. If an incompletely theorized agreement often turns 
out to be little more than agreement to disagree, an entirely un-theorized 
disagreement is a matter of simple confusion only making discord less ap-
parent and less articulate. And in potentially troubling ways in the contem-
porary world, it abets the transfer of power to judges as an alternative to 
the more open contest of clashing political visions.88 In this regard, of 
                                                            
85. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 82, at 137. 
86. See Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 237 BRITISH MED. J. 1419-20 (2003).  
87. Jeremy Waldron makes this point frequently, most recently in his paper Is Dignity the Foun-
dation of Human Rights? (2013), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/jurisprudence/ 
docs/2013/Waldron.pdf. But the real question is not whether other concepts involve disa-
greement but whether human dignity involves too much of it. 
88. Consider the writings (including a forthcoming book on human dignity) of former Israeli 
Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak for a specimen of exceptionally high confidence in the 
constitutional judge‟s ability to correctly deploy various interpretive techniques—most fa-
mously, proportionality balancing supposed to honor human dignity as one factor in a mix of 
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course, the contemporary judicialization of dignity—itself foreseen by no 
one involved in its 1930s and 1940s constitutionalization—is a case in point 
of a much larger development. And that is another story.  
                                                                                                                                          
various others. See also ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH 
OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2012). 
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APPENDIX: GOOGLING DIGNITY 
Google Ngrams (http://books.google.com/ngrams) chart natural lan-
guage trends through scanned books in various languages, with the inci-
dence of surveyed words or phrases compared across time, as a percentage 
of the number of books for each year. 
 
1. Human dignity ascends in German during World War II, not because 
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2. The notion of the “dignity of the human person” (the standard Cath-
olic formula in the era) ascends in the mid-1930s and first in French—not 
surprisingly given that its principal theorists were operating in that lan-
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3. It was only the resolution of war that cut off the alternative proposal 
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4. By and large, “dignity” (perhaps along with aristocratic value 
frameworks generally) is in decline. A recent rather than long-term expla-
nation is therefore required for contemporary (post-2000) increases in the 
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